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In this thesis the author examines the impact of enhanced
educational benefits in the form of a Navy College Fund (NCF)
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Army College Fund. The economic supply model is used to
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In the presence of a declining youth population, low
unemployment, a widening gap between civilian and military
pay, and an increasing first-term attrition rate, the Navy is
faced with unprecedented problems in manning its enlisted
force. To compensate for the strong economy and the decline
in relative military pay. Navy manpower planners have
several policy options. From a recruiting standpoint, these
options include: increase the number of recruiters; increase
the amount of advertising; use enlistment bonuses; and
implement a program of enhanced educational benefits similar
to the current Army College Fund (ACF)
.
The first three options target the traditional Navy
recruiting market of work-oriented youths and high school
seniors. However, this population is heavily recruited by
civilian businesses and colleges as well as by the other
Services. The Navy still manages to acquire 40 percent of
its nev/ recruits from high school seniors. To maintain its
quality and quantity of recruits, it would be beneficial for
the Navy to develop a new marketing strategy, a strategy that
would minimize conflict with the other Services and allow the
Navy to obtain the needed numbers of high-quality recruits.
The implementation of a Navy College Fund is the basis of a
new marketing strategy to target the college-bound youth
market.
The college-bound youth market is a market that contains
the high-quality recruits desired for technical Navy skills
and one that is still open to development. It appears that
this market, despite the decline in the youth population, is
growing. This is evident in the increasing number of SAT and
ACT examinees, and the rising number of college enrollments.
In addition, the current Youth Attitude Tracking survey
(YATs) shows that a majority (77-80 percent) of high school
seniors and young men have a strong interest in attending
college. [Ref 1, End 1, p. 1]. Furthermore, several studies
on the educational expectations of high school seniors and
high school graduates indicate a strong desire to pursue
advanced education as a reason to enlist in the military [Ref
2] . This is a break from the traditional rationale that
education benefits are a service member's right. But the
Navy College Fund would be designed to enhance the educa-
tional benefits of certain targeted recruits who would not
otherwise enter the military.
The Army College Fund represents a very successful pene-
tration of the college-bound youth market. This program
demonstrates that there are individuals who are willing to
exchange military srvice in specific Army Military Occupa-
tional Specialties (MOSs) for future educational benefits.
The ACF evolved following the termination of the Vietnam-Era
GI Bill as a recruiting incentive targeting the college-
bound youth market.
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Since the end of World War II through the early years
of the All-Volunteer Force, post-service educational bene-
fits were viewed as a service member's right. These bene-
fits were also considered as compensation for compulsory
service during the years of the draft and the three major
conflicts occurring during this period. With the end of the
"GI Bill" benefits on 31 December 1976, the Services suffered
an initial loss of high-quality recruits in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. To offset the loss of the GI Bill educa-
tional benefits and to restore post-service educational bene-
fits, the Post Vietnam-Era Veterans' Educational Assistance
Program (or VEAP) was instituted. VEAP provided a 2-to-l
matching program for funds, based upon the service member's
contribution to the program (with a maximum contribution of
$2,700 by the individual and $5,400 by the government).
VEAP was a failure in many ways. First of all, it failed
to attract many high-quality recruits, and participation in
id^the program was limited. To increase participation in
VEAP and to give the Army a unique recruiting incentive, the
Army College Fund (ACF) was established in 1982. This
program consisted of monetary "kickers" for qualified
recruits (high school diploma graduates, with aptitude test
scores above the 50th percentile) who entered tai^igeted
skills, specifically the combat arms. The amount of the
kicker was dependent upon the individual's length of
service.
In 1985, the Montgomery GI Bill was enacted as an exper-
imental program. Like VEAP, the Montgomery GI Bill requires
a contribution on behalf of the member ($1,200 in the first
12 months of service) with a total benefit of $10,800. With
the new GI Bill in effect, the ACF was restructured to a
a maximum benefit of $14,400. The combined effect of the
new GI Bill and the ACF meant that a qualified new recruit
can earn a maximum of $25,200 for a four-year enlistment in
a selected MOS.
Like the ACF, the Navy College Fund is intended to serve
two primary purposes: 1) to increase the number of high-
aptitude recruits in those skill ratings suffering from
personnel shortages, and 2) to expand recruiting to the
college-bound market. It is anticipated that these high-
quality recruits will replace the lower-quality, general
detail recruits (or GENDETs) currently backfilling certain
"A" school seats. GENDETs are selected during recruit
training to fill vacant "A" school quotas and have very
different quality and retention characteristcs than do those
who enlist for guaranteed training. Most notably, GENDETs
have a first-term attrition rate that is 11 percent greater
than their counterparts in guaranteed "A" school assign-
ments. Because of this higher attrition rate, more GENDET
accessions are needed than high-quality accessions to meet
enlisted planning requirements. In addition, waivers of
minimum eligibility scores are often needed to allow the
GENDETs to attend most "A" schools. [Ref 1 End 1 p. 5].
In fiscal 1990, 8,684 NCF accessions would be needed to
eliminate most "A" school assignments backfilled with
GENDETs across 37 ratings. The initial objective of the NCF
would be to make up this shortage in "A" school graduates,
The NCF would then be adjusted each year, based upon
utilization and quality trends in targeted ratings, to meet
the changing needs of the Navy. [Ref 1 End. 1 p. 6]
These arguments are the foundation for implementing the
Navy College Fund. But an important question is: How will
this program affect Navy recruiting? To assess the impact
of enhanced educational benefits upon recruiting, this
thesis sets out to analyze statistically the effects of the
Army College Fund upon Army recruiting. The implications of
these findings for Navy recruiting are then examined. This
study also estimates the potential cost savings of using
high-quality recruits in place of GENDETs in targeted
ratings.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Prior studies of enhanced educational benefits since the
termination of the Vietnam-Era GI Bill can be divided into
two groups: the Rand experiments of the early 1980s and the
economic analyses of enlistment supply over the last seven
years. This chapter reviews the results of the Rand experi-
ments. It also examines selected economic studies of active-
duty manpower supply.
A. THE EXPERIMENTS
. The first experiment relating to enhanced educational
benefits was the "Multiple Option Recruiting Experiment"
(MORE) OF 1979. As reported by Haggstrom et al, this program
tested the attractiveness of two-year enlistment terms and
enhanced post-service educational benefits (or "kickers") as
recruiting incentives for the Army's combat arms and for
engineering ratings in the Navy [Ref 3] . The enhanced
educational benefits varied by branch of service and over
time. The initial Army VEAP "kicker" was $1,000 for each
year of obligated service up to four years. Later during the
experiment, the Army tested a "super VEAP kicker" of $2,000
above the regular VEAP kicker. The Navy tested two separate
VEAP kickers: an additional $2,000 in one test area, and
$4,000 in another test area.
The Army experiment offered various combinations of
enlistment incentives in six test areas. These options
were, by test area:
Area 1 ; Two-year option, assignment to Europe, with >
VEAP kickers.
Area 2 : Two-year term with VEAP kickers.
Area 3 : Assignment to Europe, with VEAP kickers. . -.v'
Area 4 ; VEAP kickers.
Area 5 ; Two-year option, assignment to Europe, with
VEAP kickers for those enlisting for 3 or 4
years.
Area 6 ; Control group.
The Navy offered various combinations of options in dif-
ferent areas as well, but these options were limited to a
few select test areas. The Navy options were only open to
high-quality enlistees. By test area, the available options
were
:
Area A : Two-year option with VEAP kicker and immediate
"A" school assignment.
Area B : Two-year option with VEAP kicker and "A" school
upon reenlistment
.
Area C : Two-year option with "A" school upon reenlist-
ment.
Area D ; Two-year option.
Area E : Control group.
Area F : VEAP kicker of $4,000 for four-year enlistment.
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Each service used geographically dispersed Armed Forces
Entrance and Examining Stations (or AFEES) , chosen to repre-
sent a balance in terms of preexperimental recruiting
performances. Additionally, as seen above, the Navy tested
whether guaranteed "A" school assignments would be effective
as enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. Also, the $4,000
VEAP kicker in Area F was discontinued when the quota of 500
enlistments was reached, so this cell only represents three
and one-half months of the experiment.
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provided data
for the experiment on monthly enlistment contracts for each
AFEES by Service, sex, Armed Forces Qualification Test
(AFQT) category, and educational attainment for the period
January 1978 through December 1979. Data for unemployment
and wage levels of each AFEES were derived from monthly
reports provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The response to the various enlistment incentives was
measured by the relative increase in recruiting performance
by each test area from 1978 to 1979. Regression analysis
was performed on unemployment rates, wages, and recruiting
levels by test area to control for migration between test
areas (recruit migration from a control area to an experi-
mental area) and recruiter effort during the experiment.
For the educational benefits in the Army test areas, the
two-year option test areas experienced a 4.1 percent rela-
tive increase in enlistments; and the three- and four-year
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test areas demonstrated an overall 7 percent relative in-
crease in enlistments. Combined response to the VEAP kickers
was a 7.8 percent relative increase in test areas with the
optional European assignment, and a 3.8 percent relative
increase when European assignment was mandatory. The total
response to the super VEAP kickers was a 2.1 relative
increase above the response for the standard VEAP kicker.
Two economic models were then estimated using regression
analysis applied to the data. Model One contained variables
for each test area, while Model Two contained variables for
each option. Both models contained variables for unemploy-
ment, wages, recruiters, and for time (month of the year).
The dependent variable for each model was the logarithm of
the number of enlistments.
The estimated regression coef ficiients of the explanatory
variables in Model One did not differ greatly from the raw
relative increases reported above. All of the test area
coefficients had statistically insignificant effects on high-
quality enlistments. For Model Two, the regression coeffi-
cients for the options were also statistically insignificant
with respect to high-quality enlistments; although they did
display a small positive effect on overall enlistments. How-
ever, the test areas did out-perform the control areas in at-
tracting high-quality recruits, especially those who entered
through the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) . The MORE also did
not greatly affect the occupational choices of enlistees.
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During MORE, the Navy suffered an overall decline in
high-quality enlistments. Of the test areas offering
enhanced educational benefits. Area F only offered the VEAP
kicker for a limited period, so the full effect of the option
could not be determined. Overall, the test areas offering
educational benefits displayed a 1.3 percent relative
increase in high-quality recruits. The regression analysis
(similar to the analysis of Army results) revealed that none
of the educational benefits had a statistically significant
effect upon high-quality enlistments. However, the authors
of the study point out that the Navy data contained factors
that could not be adequately separated due to the limited
size of the experimental areas and the short duration of the
$4,000 VEAP kicker option.
The MORE can be viewed as offering too many options in
too few test areas with limited attractiveness. The Army
restrictions for European assignment and the Navy restric-
tions for Marine Engineering and Firemen ratings may have
served to offset the incentives instigated by the VEAP
kickers. Since the attractiveness of the standard VEAP was
very low, and had an insignificant effect on enlistments,
this may have had a further disrupting effect upon the
experiment. Therefore, the lessons of the MORE may tell us
more about how not to run a social science experiment than
about the effects of selected enlistment options.
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The MORE study was followed in 1981 by the Educational
Assistance Test Program (EATP) . As reported by Richard
Fernandez, the EATP consisted of three test programs: Ultra
VEAP kicker (UVK) , a Noncontributory VEAP (NCV) , and a
Tuition Stipend (T/S) . [Ref 4 p. 13] The EATP was
initiated because of the poor quality of Army recruits in
1980 and a Congressional desire to provide recruiters with
new tools to attract enlistees. [Ref 4 p. 11] The
experiment included the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.
Like the MORE program, each service selected geographically
diverse AFEES to form test and control cells. The EATP was
based on the concept that a recruit is a rational economic
person who can evaluate alternatives by discounting them to
present value and then compare them.
The four test programs consisted of:
Control : Basic VEAP, with kickers up to $6,000 for
the Army.
Ultra VEAP : Army kickers to $12,000.
Noncontrib- DOD pays Army enlistee's contribution with
tory VEAP : Army kickers up to $6,000.
Tuition/ For all Services, tuition assistance of
Stipend : $1200 a year plus $300-a-month subsistence
allowance, transferable to dependents or a
cash-out on reenlistment
.
To be eligible for one of the test programs, the recruit had
to be a high school diploma graduate (HSDG) , scoring in AFQT
categories I-IIIA, (upper 50th percentile) , and entering a
targeted skill area.
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The methodology of the experiment consisted of comparing
the test cells with the control cells in terms of growth or
decline in enlistments from the base period. It was assumed
that the control cells would take into account changes in
recruitment due to world outlook (e.g., the Hostage crisis).
Regression analysis was used to improve the estimates of
program effects by developing a model for all changes that
could be measured. Four variables were used in measuring
civilian employment opportunities: average hourly earnings
of production employees, average weekly hours of production
employees, total employment and the unemployment rate for
workers 16 and older. Recruiting effort was measured by the
number of production recruiters fielded by each Service by
month. The data were then converted to conform to AFEES
areas. (This turned out to be a complex procedure, because
both Army and Navy data were required. This necessitated
converting the data from 54 Army Recruiting Battalions and
42 Navy Recruiting Districts to conform to AFEES areas.)
Data were then obtained from DMDC for recruit contracts,
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (the monthly publication
"Employment and Earnings") for civilian labor market
conditions, and from the Census Bureau for estimates of the
youth population by county.
Table I shows the relative increase of high-quality, new
recruits by Service and test cell. Each figure gives the
ratio of the absolute increase to the increase in the
12
control area. For the Army and the Navy, the "Ultra VEAP
kickers" resulted in the largest relative increase in en-
listment contracts. In the Navy, this was closely followed
by the Tuition/Stipend program. The Noncontributory VEAP
.^.
showed the smallest relative increase in enlistments, with
almost no effect on Army enlistments and modest increases
for the Navy and the Air Force. As seen here, the Tuition/
Stipend program was detrimental to the Army, yet beneficial
to the Navy and the Air Force.
TABLE I
RESULTS OF THE EATP EXPERIMENT BY SERVICE ..,
Relative Increase in High-quality
Enlistments by Service
TEST CELL ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE
UVK 8.72 8.39 1.42
NCV -0.12 3.42 3.60
T/S -6.10 8.22 5.55
Source: R. L. Fernandez, "Enlistment Effects and
Policy Implications of the Educational Assistance
Test Program"
Fernandez then investigated the influences of hourly
earnings, hours worked weekly, employment, and unemployment
rate upon each of the test cells. Additionally, he tracked
the number of production recruiters by test cell. The NCV
had higher wages and higher unemployment than the remaining
cells (due in part to high unemployment in Detroit) . For the
Army recruiter, levels remained constant; for the Navy and
the Air Force recruiter, levels decreased in test cells
offering T/S and increased for cells offering NCV.
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Because of the uneven changes in economic factors and
recruiters, regression analysis was conducted to control
for changes across test cells. Using a log-linear model,
with the log of enlistments by AFEES as the dependent
variable, Fernandez estimated a separate model for each
Service. The regression analysis confirmed the test cell
effects exhibited in Table I. The UVK resulted in a
statistically significant increase of 9 percent high-
quality enlistees for the Army and the Navy. The NCV
resulted in a significant increase of 5 percent for Air
Force enlistments, but the co-efficient was not significant
for either the Army and the Navy. The T/S resulted in an
enlistment increase of 10 percent for the Navy and an
increase of 7.5 percent for the Air Force, but a 6 percent
decrease for the Army.
Fernandez maintains that the UVK can raise enlistments
in the army without hurting the other Services because of
spillover effects from one Service to another. At the same
time, the T/S results indicate heavy inter-Service
competition, hurting Army enlistments and benefiting the
other Services. Of the remaining variables— time, economic
indicators, and recruiters—each Service had mixed results.
Overall, an increase in hourly wages, weekly hours, and
employment decreased the quantity of enlistments, while
increases in unemployment rate and the number of recruiters
increased the quantity of enlistments. The unemployment
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elasticities varied by Service, ranging from .24 to .29 and
estimated recruiter elasticities varied from .09 to .30.
Fernandez concludes that the EATP experiment gives the
first evidence that a generaous educational benefit can help
the Services attract high-quality enlistees, and that this
program need not be open to all enlistees. The EATP also
suggests that the primary reason for low participation rates
in VEAP is not the requirement for individual contributions,
but the small overall benefit. The author also reports that
the EATP options did result in skill channeling in all the
.
Services.
The only shortcoming in the evaluation of EATP results
lies in the concepts of spillover and competition. Total
high-quality enlistments for the Army increased 22 percent
during the test period, while Navy high-quality enlistments
decreased 2 percent and Air Force enlistments increased 8
percent. In the UVK test cells, enlistments in the Army and
the Navy increased by 9 percent. The Army increase was
attributed to the $12,000 VEAP kicker. The Navy's increase
had no clear cause, because it only offered the standard
VEAP, leading to the argument of spillover from Service to
Service.
Under T/S, all three Services' test cells increased their
enlistments by offering the same program. Without the
advantage in benefits, the Army posted a smaller relative
increase in enlistments to its base year (14 percent) than in
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its other test cells and a relative decrease compared to its
control group. The Navy demonstrated a relative 3 percent
increase over the base year and an 8.2 percent relative in-
crease to its control group, with the control group posting a
5 percent decrease in enlistments relative to the base year.
Because of the better recruiter performance of the T/S test
cells and the poor recruiter performance in the NCV and UVK
cells, the Navy was forced to shift recruiters away from the
T/S test cells to compensate for the low-quantity of enlis-
tees enlistees being obtained elsehwere. Apparently, the
movement of Navy and Air Force recruiters out of the T/S
cells (Army recruiters only increased slightly in the T/S
cells) demonstrates that the UVK and NCV test cells experi-
enced more inter-Service competition than the equitable T/S,
-with the Army still coming out on top in the number of
enlistments in all test cells.
The regression analysis would, of course, confirm the raw
data of the experiment's findings, given the nature of the
independent variables used. Therefore, the argument that the
T/S cell resulted in increased inter-Service competition is
easily disputed. In fact, given the same enlistment incen-
tives, the Army would have to work as hard as the other
Services, because it now lacked a recruiting advantage. Con-
sidering that one of the reasons for the EATP was to improve
the Army's recruiting tools (more so than the other Services),
the authors comments may be viewed as biased in behalf of the
Army.
^^
B. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ENLISTMENTS
Goldberg and Greenston, in "Economic Analysis of Army
Enlistments: Policy Implications", used Time-Series Cross-
Sectional (TSCS) data to model active duty enlistment
supply. Using annual Navy Recruiting District (NRD) level
data from fiscal 1976 through fiscal 1983 (assuming that the
number of HSDG, in AFQT test categories I through IIIA, con-
tracts were a log-linear function of supply factors) , the
authors developed an enlistment supply model of economic,
demographic, and policy variables. These variables included:
relative military pay, cyclical and long-run civilian unem-
ployment levels, a dummy variable to represent the loss of
the GI Bill and to account for VEAP, population, racial mix,
urban/rural mix, and the number of recruiters. A separate
model was estimated for each Service.
Goldberg and Greenston predicted that certain recruiting
districts wouled experience more enlistments--specifically
,
those districts that had high, relative military pay, an in-
crease in either cyclical or long-run regional unemployment,
large populations, large urban areas, and more recruiters.
At the same time, the two detractors to high-quality enlist-
ment were identified: loss of the GI Bill and districts
with higher percentages of blacks.
The analyses by Goldberg and Greenston suggest that a
one percent increase in relative military pay would result
in a 2.29 percent increase in Army high-quality recruit
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supply and a 0.97 percent increase in Navy high-quality
recruit supply. A one percent increase in unemployment
would result in a 6.5 percent increase in Army recruit
supply and a 3.4 percent increase in Navy recruit supply.
This model also suggests that, since 1977 the Army and the
Navy experienced a 35 percent and 28 percent loss, respec-.
tively, in high-quality recruit supply due to the loss of
the GI Bill. The authors also found the Army's Ultra VEAP
(ACF) did not have a statistically significant effect on
total enlistments, but that it was effective in channeling
enlistees into targeted occupations. [Ref 5 p. 70]
Goldberg and Greenston also discuss the high cost of
implementing a GI Bill similar to the Vietnam-Era GI Bill.
Their cost estimate was based upon a DOD estimate that a
return to the Vietnam-Era GI Bill had the potential to
attract an additional 18,000 high-quality recruits, at a
total cost of $2 billion, which would result in a cost of
$111,100 per additional high-quality recruit ($2 billion
divided by 18,000 recruits). And at this cost, there are
far more economical ways to attract additional high-
quality recruits, such as a ten percent pay raise for the
high-quality Non-Prior Service (NPS) males only or a ten
percent increase in the number of recruiters. (The cost
would vary from $1,200 to $8,200 per recruit.) [Ref 5 pp.
70-71]
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Goldberg and Greenston's extensive econometric modeling
of enlistment supply shows the effects of unemployment, pay,
loss of the GI Bill, and recruiters upon enlistments. The
only shortfall may be in their calculations of the effects
of the Army College Fund. At the time of their analysis,
the ACF had only been in effect for one year, and partici-
pation was restricted to the combat arms. Their methodol-
ogy was sound, but they may have lacked sufficient data to
fully measure the impact of the ACF.
Daula and Smith, in "Recruiting Goals, Enlistment
Supply, and Enlistments in the U.S. Army", also measured the
impact of the ACF on Army enlistments from 1980 to 1983.
The sample was limited to the period after fiscal 1980
because of changes in Army policy regarding the definition
of enlistment goals and penalties. In addition, data
regarding some variables were not available for earlier
periods. [Ref 6 p. 108] Daula and Smith also used Time-
Series Cross-Sectional data from Army Recruiting Battalions
(districts) in a log-linear model to determine the influence
of economic, sociodemographic variables, interservice com-
petition, and recruiting resources on the enlistment of
supply-constrained (NFS, high-quality males) and demand-
constrained recruits.
The varialbes in the models were similar to those used
by Goldberg and Greenston, with additional variables for:
high-quality mission, other DOD high-quality enlistments,
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advertising, ACF, Noncontributory VEAP, Mini GI Bill, and
Enlistment Bonus Test cells. Of the variables representing
either cash or education bonuses, only the ACF had a statis-
tically significant effect on recruiting. Also, the ACF had
an elasticity of .25 for high-quality enlistments and an
overall elasticity of 0.16, far greater than the relative
effect found by Fernandez in the EATP. [Ref 6 p. 115]
The greater influence of the ACF upon enlistments found
by Daula and Smith, as opposed to the findings by Goldberg
and Greenstons, may be due to the data. In the Daula and
Smith study, the ACF had been in effect for two years.
Nevertheless, Daula and Smith have shown that the ACF was
significant in attracting high-quality recruits into the
Army
.
In "The Economic Determinants of Military Enlistment
Rates", Dale and Gilroy also found that educational benefits
were an important influence on the enlistment decisions of
young men. In the first model estimated by Dale and Gilroy,
the variables representing educational benefits were measured
in real terms by deflating with the Consumer Price Index.
The results suggest that the real value of educational
benefits (holding constant the effects of inflation) were
significant in explaining enlistment rates for young men.
Furthermore, the VEAP kickers were significant in explaining
the enlistments of white men. [Ref. 7 p. 11]
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A second set of models based upon AFQT group were also
examined using the current (rather than real) value of the
educational benefits. Here, too, educational benefits were
found to have a significant impact on the enlistment rates
for high-quality males. Dale and Gilroy concluded that
unemployment, relative military pay, and noneconomic factors
all play an important role in determining the enlistment
rate. They also noted that educational benefits are very
important to high school graduates in the highest AFQT
categories. [Ref 6 pp. 30-31]
The two Rand experiments and the three economic analyses
of enlistments agree that educational benefits can have a
significant effect upon high-quality enlistments, along with
other factors such as the number of production recruiters,
relative military pay, and advertising expenditures. This
thesis explores the effect of educational benefits on high-
quality enlistments, controlling for the effects of pay,
recruiters, and other factors. The focus is on the impact of
educational benefits on recruitment and determining whether
the Navy College Fund would be a cost-effective method of
expanding the Navy's recruiting market.
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to estimate an econometric
model of Army enlistment supply, focusing on the effect of
the Army College Fund. The data for this analysis were
generously provided by the U.S. Army Recruiting Command at
Fort Sheridan, Illinois.*
A. DATA
The Army enlistment data consist of 78 monthly observa-
tions for each of the 54 Army Recruiting Battalions from the
first quarter of fiscal 1981 through the second quarter of
fiscal 1987. Also included are observations for the follow-
ing variables:
— the number of high-quality enlistments;
— number of production recruiters;
-- Recruiting Battalion high quality mission;
-- the unemployment rate for each battalion;
-- the military-civilian pay ratio for each battalion;
-- the qualified population;
— the minority population;
— dummy variables representing the various experimental
educational benefit and enlistment bonus programs;
— and dummy variables representing the ACF and enlist-
ment bonus programs.
*The author would like to thank Dr. Bob Wegner and Mr.
Jurl Toomepuu of the Research and Studies Division of
the U.S. Army Recruiting Command for providing the data
used in the analysis.
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Data were also available for Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
Force enlistment, covering the 30-month period from the first
quarter of fiscal 1985 through the second quarter of fiscal
1987. However, data on the mission are not available. Also,
due to a lack of information on the Navy, Marine Corps, and
Air Force from the period prior to the implementation of the
ACF, the analysis of this study is restricted to Army high-
quality enlistments.
B . METHODOLOGY
The standard econometric model of enlistment supply
utilizing pooled time-series cross-sectional data is:
InH = Z b. (InX. ) + u (1)11
where InH is the natural logarithm of high-quality (high-
quality enlistees are high school diploma graduates, testing
in AFQT categories I through IIIA) enlistments, InX. repre-
sents i determinants of high-quality supply, the b's repre-
sent the parameters to be estimated and u is the error term.
The model assumes that enlistment supply is a log-linear
function of various economic and sociodemographic factors.
This study controls for the effect of various economic
and sociodemographic factors to isolate the effects of the
ACF and the enlistment bonus program on high-quality Army
enlistments. The next section discusses the construct of the
explanatory variables used in the model.
23
C. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
In this study, the variables used to explain high-quality
enlistments are: unemployment, civilian to military pay
ratio, the number of Army production recruiters, the quali-
fied population, the minority population, and dummy variables
representing the Army College Fund and the Enlistment Bonus
Program. Each variable is discussed briefly in turn.
1 . Unemployment
LUN = the natural logarithm of the civilian unemploy-
ment rate. Unemployment in this data set represents the
local unemployment rate for all age categories within a
battalion area. Unemployment is used as a proxy to represent
fluctuations in the business cycle in a region (Recruiting
Battalion) . As unemployment increases, the number of high-
quality enlistments is expected to increase; as the unemploy-
ment rate decreases, the number of high-quality enlistments
is expected to decrease.
2. Pay Ratio
LPAY = the natural logarithm of civilian to military
pay ratio. Pay ratio was measured by comparing local manu-
facturing wages within a Recruiting Battalion to entry level
military wages (an average of paygrades El through E3) . Pay
ratio is a measure of the relative economic attractiveness of
military over civilian employment. Earlier studies have
shown that, while high-quality recruits are not as strongly
affected by relative pay as are low-quality recruits, this
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effect is statistically significant for both high- and low-
quality recruits. Therefore, if the pay ratio narrows or
favors the military, it should have a positive effect on the
number of enlistments. That is, the expected sign of the
estimated coefficient of LPAY is negative.
3. Recruiters
LARR = the natural logarithm of Army production
recruiters assigned to the battalion. Recruiters are usually
assigned to a Recruiting Battalion based upon that battal-
ion's population and previous recruiting performance. Addi-
tional recruiters are reassigned to battalions that are not
fulfilling their mission from battalions that are meeting or
exceeding their quotas. Therefore, recruiters should have a
positive effect upon the number of enlistments; but this
effect should be subject to diminishing returns.
4. Qualified Population
LAPOP = the natural logarithm of the high-quality
(high-school diploma graduates, testing in AFQT categories I
through IIIA) youth population. The population estimates in
this data set are from Wood and Poole estimates of youth
population based upon the 1980 census. As the high-quality
population of a battalion increases, so should the number of
high-quality enlistments. This is due in part to the effect
of recruiters; the larger the population, the more
recruiters there are assigned to an area and the higher the
mission assigned to large population areas.
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The variable mission has been used in many econo-
metric models of enlistment supply. Missions are usually
assigned to a battalion based upon that battalion's popula-
tion, unemployment rate, previous performance, and the needs
of the Army. Kostiuk [Ref 8] has determined that recruit
mission quotas are in part determined by the same factors as
enlistment supply. Also, if quotas do not represent a bind-
ing constraint on observed enlistments (i.e., battalions
failing to meet mission) , Kostiuk points out that enlistment
supply is probably being accurately measured by the econo-
metric model. The data used in this econometric analysis
indicate that Army Recruiting Battalions, more often than
not, met or exceeded their mission quotas. This does not
mean than mission quotas do not have an effect on enlistment
supply. However, the ultimate goal of this analysis is
prediction, that is to forecast the implications of enhanced
educational benefits on Navy recruiting based upon the Army's
experience with the ACF. Therefore, it was decided not
to include the variable mission in this econometric model.
5. Minorities
LPM = the natural logarithm of the percentage of a
battalion's total population comprised of minorities. This
is expected to have a negative effect upon high-quality
enlistments, since minority groups tend to score lower on the
AFQT than do whites, and proportionately fewer minorities
than whites possess a high school diploma.
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6. Enlistment Incentives
Enlistment incentives are measured by two separate
dummy variables. FUND = 1 when the ACF is in effect;
BONUS = 1 to represent the effect of the enlistment bonus
program. Each variable is set to when the program is not
in effect. These variables are expected to have a positive
effect on enlistments. Human capital theory supports this
hypothesized relationship in that a cash bonus or a guarantee
of enhanced educational benefits may be necessary to overcome
an individual's reservation wage (the minimum wage necessary
to make military service a realistic option) . Each of these
programs targets a specific cohort of the youth market.
Guaranteed future educational benefits target those
individuals who are more forward-looking, e.g., individuals
with a low internal personal discount rate. These are
typically the college-bound youths who are willing to put off
their entry into the job market to invest their time and
money in training and education for a better job in the
future. The cash bonus targets individuals who are more
present-oriented, e.g., individuals with a high internal
personal discount rate--that is, those individuals who are
entering the job market, but need an extra incentive to make
the military an attractive option.
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Thus the full model to be estimated is specified as
follows
:
InH = a + b.LUN +b LPAY +b2LARR + b^LAPOP (2)
+ b^LPM + b,FUND +b_BONUS+ u
b b /
The loglinear (constant elasticity) specification means the
estimated coefficients (b. 's) can be interpreted as
elasticities.
7. Nature of the Error Term
There are many problems inherent in pooled time-
series, cross-sectional data that make estimation of the
model by ordinary least squares (OLS) problematic. Within
this model, problems can be expected with many of the
variables. Recruiters ae strongly correlated with population
and mission, because they are assigned based upon a recruit
battalion's size and previous performance. Therefore, a
larger battalion should always produce more enlistments than
a smaller battalion. This occurs in part because the larger
battalion, due to its population, has more recruiters and a
higher recruiting goal. Warner resolved this problem by
dividing the error term into two components: [Ref 9 p. 9]
U^ = z. + v.^ (3)
The first component (z.) characterizes the battalion-specific
fixed effects and the second component (v-
.
) captures the
random errors inherent in the model. Warner believes that
the battalion-specific effects capture the effects of omitted
variables that vary over the cross-section units but not over
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time, and that these fixed effects are correlated with vari-
ables within the model, which may lead to biased estimates of
the explanatory variables if the model is estimated by OLS.
A second problem is measurement error in the vari-
ables. The pay ratio is not a readily observable quantity
(such as recruiters and enlistments) but is the result of
surveys and calculations. Therefore, it is likely there will
be problems with the measurement of the pay ratio variable
leading to downward biased estimators. [Ref 9 p. 9] In
addition, the pay ratio reflects the civilian pay of all age
groups, not just that of civilian youth. This imparts
another source of measurement error.
Another possible measurement error within this data
set is associated with the population variable. In the data
set, all of the various measures of population vary across
battalions but are constant over time. Therefore, changes in
youth cohort size and distribution over time are not repre-
sented, which may lead to biased estimators for population
within the model.
When using pooled time-series, cross-section data in
regression models, the error term is not always independent
across time or over geographic areas (cross-sectional units)
,
indicating the presence of autocorrelation. There are also
the added problems of heteroscedasticity and autoregression.
To obtain unbiased, efficient estimators for the model
specified above, the Parks estimating method is utilized.
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[Ref 10] (This methodology is imbedded in SAS procedure
TSCSREG.) Parks considered the first-order autoregressive
model in which random errors are either autocorrelated or
contemporaneously correlated across cross-sectional units and
have the following structure:
2




— E(U. U, .) = "^ • v contemporaneously correlated
and — U. . = o,U, , + a . . autoregression.ij 1 1,3-1 i:
In the Parks method, the beta coefficients are estimated by a
two-step generalized least squares procedure.
The first-step in estimating the error term involves
the use of ordinary least squares to estimate the beta coef-
ficients and to obtain the fitted residuals:
" = ^ - ^^LS <^^
Where U represents the random error, Y represents the
dependent variable and XB represents the OLS estimates
of the beta coefficients. A consistent estimator of the
first-order autoregressive parameter is then estimated, and
the autoregressive characteristics of the data are removed
asymptotically through the transformation of taking weighted
differences .
*
*One beneficial aspect of the Parks method is that the
transformed model has not lost any of the original
observations.
The second step consists of applying OLS to the
transformed model to obtain a consistent estimator of a . .
.
U* = Y* - X*B*Q^3 (5)
It can be shown that this estimator of the error term is
consistent and asymptotially normally distributed. Finally,
generalized least squares are used to obtain the final beta
coefficients.
Through the Parks Method, this model should produce
robust estimators of the economic, and sociodemographic
variables and their effects upon the enlistments of high-
quality youth. Furthermore, the variables FUND and BONUS
should reflect the effect of these programs on high-quality
Army enlistments. The next chapter reviews the results of
the estimation of this model and the implications of the
statistical results for Navy recruiting policies.
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IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
The analysis is divided into two parts. The first
section discusses the results of the high-quality Army
enlistment supply model. The second section discusses a
cost-benefit analysis of the proposed Navy College Fund
based, in part, on the results of the enlistment supply
model
.
A. ESTIMATES OF THE HIGH-QUALITY ARMY ENLISTMENT SUPPLY
MODEL
Since the inception of the ACF, the growth in Army high-
quality enlistments (defined as high school diploma graduates
in AFQT categories I-IIIA) , has surpassed that of the other
Services and has outpaced the overall growth in high-quality
enlistments for all Services combined. As depicted in Table
II, the proportion of high-quality enlistments in the Army
increased by 20 percent between fiscal 1982 and 1988, while
the proportion of high-quality enlistments increased by just
eight percent in the Navy. In all Services combined, high-
quality enlistments increased by approximately 15 percent
between fiscal 1982 and fiscal 1988.
The reasons for the rapid growth in high-quality enlist-
ments throughout the military are varied. The recruitment
picture in the 1980s was marked by several trends: an
increase in relative military pay; a worsening, and then
improving economy; an increased high-quality recruiting
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mission; the inception of the Army enlistment bonus; and the
introduction of the Army College Fund. The econometric
analysis of high-quality Army enlistments presented here
attempts to model the enlistments during this time frame, and
estimate the policy effects of recruiters, enlistment
bonuses, and especially of the ACF.
TABLE II
PERCENT OF ENLISTMENTS WHO
ARE "HIGH-QUALITY" BY ARMY, NAVY, AND ALL SERVICES
FISCAL 1982 THROUGH FISCAL 1988*
Fiscal Year
Service 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Army 39 45 47 50 53 58 59
Navy 44 53 50 50 47 52 52
All 45 52 52 53 55 60 60
Services
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.
* "High-quality enlistments include high school diploma
graduates, testing in AFQT categories I-IIIA.
The sample data set consists of observations of 53 Army
Recruiting Battalions over a 78-month period, from October
1980 through March 1988, yielding a total of 4,134 observa-
tions. Two Army Recruiting Battalions were not included in
the sample data set due to missing observations. Additional-
ly, due to missing data on Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
recruiting experience, for certain years, the analysis is
restricted to the Army only. The dependent variable is the
total number of Army high-quality accessions.
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The results of the estimation of the high-quality Army
enlistment supply model are shown in Table III. Column 1 of
Table III provides the results of estimating the model by the
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) procedure without correcting for
autocorrelation. Column 2 provides the results after cor-
recting for autocorrelation. This correction was accom-
plished through the Parks method, which utilizes General
Least Square (GLS) estimators, assuming a first-order auto-
regressive (ARl) error structure. The model in column 1 of
Table III also includes dummy variables for the second,
third, and fourth quarters of the fiscal year. These vari-
ables have been added to capture seasonal factors in recruit-
ing. These variables have not been included in the model in
column 2 because the Parks method controls for differences in
time within its estimation procedure.
In using the log-linear form for each of these models,
with all of the continuous variables measured in logarithms,
the coefficient estimates may be interpreted as elasticities.
Another feature of the log-linear model is the assumpton that
the elasticity coefficient remains constant throughout. [Ref
11]
The results in Table III are remarkably robust: all of
the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at
the .01 level or better. Also, the explanatory power of the
2 .
model is quite high for cross-sectional data. The R in
column 1 indicates the model explains about two-thirds of the
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* Figures in parenthesis are standard errors.
** Note all variables are statistically sngnificant for
p > 0.0001.
a— Model uncorrected for autocorrelation, utilizing
OLS.
b-- Model corrected for autocorrelation, using Parks
Method.
N/A Not applicable.









































variation in enlistments. The results suggest that high-
quality Army enlistments increase with unemployment, the
military-civilian pay ratio, and the number of Army produc-
tion recruiters. The results also suggest that battalions
with larger qualified populations will produce more high-
quality recruits than battalions with smaller markets, and.
that high-quality enlistments decrease as the relative size
of the minority population increases. There is also a
significant seasonal pattern to enlistments, with the largest
effects occurring in the third quarter of the fiscal year
(just after high school graduation)
.
In both of the estimated models, the variables with the
strongest influence on high-quality Army enlistment supply
are the relative pay ratio and recruiters. In the uncorrected
(OLS) models, the elasticities are .70 for pay ratio and .803
for recruiters. In the corrected model, these elasticities
fall slightly to .64 and .69, respectively. Therefore, a ten
percent increase in pay ratio increases high-quality Army
enlistments by 6.4 percent, while a ten percent increase in
recruiters increases high-quality enlistments by 6.9 percent.
However, several earlier studies have indicated that
recruiters are subject to diminishing returns (in part due to
the competition among recruiters within the limited youth
market) , leading to the conclusion that fielding additional
recruiters may not be the most cost-effective way of increas-
ing high-quality enlistments.
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Unemployment also displays a statistically significant
effect on high-quality enlistments. As shown in Table III,
the elasticity for unemployment in the uncorrected model is
.465, and it is .501 in the corrected model.
Of interest to this study are the coefficients of the
dummy variables representing the ACF and enlistment bonus.
Both of these variables are statistically significant in
their effects on high-quality enlistments. As shown in Table
III, the elasticity of the enlistment bonus is .223 in the
uncorrected modex and .289 in the corrected model. The
elasticity of the ACF is .376 in the uncorrected model and
.256 in the corrected model. This indicates that both the
ACF and the enlistment bonus have had a strong positive
effect on high-quality Army enlistments during this period.
The effects of the enlistment bonus are much stronger than
other studies have indicated. One reason for this is that
prior to December 1985, a high-quality Army enlistee could
receive the bonus and also enroll in the ACF. This practice
was stopped to reduce the cost of Army enlistment incentives.
[Ref 12 p. 2] The effects of the ACF also demonstrate a much
stronger impact on high-quality enlistments than indicated by
either the MORE or EATP experiments and by any of the earlier
econometric analyses of high-quality enlistment behavior.
This is partially the result of the increased value and
reduced personal cost, of the New GI Bill, compared with the
earlier VEAP. As reported by Warner [Ref 9 p. 16] , the
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average value of VEAP was $2,411 in 1981, while the average
value of the New GI Bill was $4,144 in 1986 (benefits are
stated in 1981 dollars) . And the individual contribution
declined from $2,700 for VEAP to $1,200 for the New GI Bill.
The next step is to use the estimated elasticities
of the ACF--and other determinants of high-quality enlistments
--to model the potential effects of a proposed NCF on Navy
high-quality enlistments. This analysis is presented in the
next section.
B. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
1. Impact of the Navy College Fund on Navy
Recruiting
The purpose of this section is to project the poten-
tial effects of the Navy College Fund using the experience of
the ACF. Using the forecasting techniques described by
Robert F. Cotterman in "Forecasting Enlisted Supply: A Time
Series of Cross Sections Model", this study attempts to pro-
ject the number of ACF-motivated enlistees for the Army in
fiscal 1990. This will serve as a basis for predicting the
number of persons who will be motivated to enlist in the Navy
by the Navy College Fund during fiscal 1990.
Cotterman 's methodology for forecasting enlistment
supply involves estimating a model to explain the enlistment
rate (the number of enlistment contracts divided by qualified
population) rather than total enlistments, as the dependent
variable. This technique consists of estimating the monthly
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enlistment rate for each Recruiting Battalion, multiplying
the enlistment rate by the qualified population of the
Recruiting Battalion, and summing the observations to obtain
the total number of projected recruits. One aspect of
Cotterman's estimator is utilizing the disturbance term, the
estimated rho values, of each cross section in the final
period observed as part of the forecast. In the Parks Method
the rho values are the estimates of first-order autocorrela-
tion in each cross-sectional area (battalion) . Because there
is autocorrelation in the disturbances, past values of the
disturbances are informative about future values, increasing
the efficiency of the forecast. [Ref 13]
To utilize this methodology necessitates changing the
dependent variable and certain independent variables in the
econometric model and reestimating the model. The changes in
the independent variables are: dropping the variable repre-
senting minority population, and combining production
recruiters with qualified population (production recruiters
divided by qualified population) to form a variable repre-
senting the ratio of production recruiters to qualified
population. The econometric analysis of enlistment rate
utilizes the same data set described earlier--53 Army
Recruiting Battalions over a 70-month period from ''October
1980 through September 1987. The sample contains 3,710
observations. The enlistment rate model is estimated
utilizing Parks Method of GLS estimation with an AR(1)
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error structure. The final six months were deleted from the
data set to allow the calculation of forecasting errors based
upon the recruiting experience of fiscal 1988.
2. The Results of the Econometric Analysis of
Enlistment
The results of the econometric analysis of enlistment
rates are shown in Table IV. Column 2 of Table IV displays
the results of estimating the model of total enlistment
TABLE IV
RESULTS OF THE MODEL OF ARMY HIGH-QUALITY
ENLISTMENT RATES
Independent ,
Variable Model 2^ Model 3
Unemployment 0.529 0.560
(.009)* (.009)*
Pay ratio 0.658 0.740
(.026) (.021)
Ratio of Recruiters N/A 0.624









Root M.S.E. .997 .996
a is the model with total number of enlistments as the
dependent variable,
b is the model with enlistment rate as the dependent
variable
.
* Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
**Note all variables are statistically significant for
p > .0001.
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supply, as above, but deleting the final six months of the
data. Column 3 displays the results of estimating the
enlistment rate equation. As depicted in Table IV, there are
only minor differences between the coefficients of the vari-
ables in the enlistment supply and enlistment rate models.
The differences are due in part to the enlistment rate model
having 424 fewer observations than the total enlistment
supply model, and the differences in variable construction.
To estimate the number of high-quality Army acces-
sions in fiscal 1990, data were obtained from the Navy
Recruiting Command on forecasted unemployment rates and
military-to-civilian pay ratios for fiscal 1990. These data
were collected by Navy Recruiting Districts and they were
matched to Army Recruiting Battalions using a conversion
program designed by the Defense Manpower Data Center for the
Naval Postgraduate School. The estimation technique used the
number of Army production recruiters for each Recruiting
Battalion in March 1988 (the last available observation)
.
Using this forecasting technique for fiscal 1988
as a test case, it was predicted that 56,076 high-quality
recruits would enlist in the Army; the actual number was
60,388, a difference of seven percent. Thus the forecasting
error of the model is acceptable. This model also estimated
that the Army could expect 9,000 ACF-motivated and 10,000
bonus-motivated recruits fiscal 1988.
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Using the Navy Recruiting Command forecast values for
unemployment and pay for fiscal 1990, it is projected that
52,000 high-quality recruits will enter the Army in fiscal
1990. Of these recruits, it is estimated that 8,376 high-
quality recruits will enlist primarily for the ACF, and that
9,840 will enlist for the bonus program. To obtain the
number of high-quality recruits the Navy can expect, we make
the following assumption: the same number of recruits
(8,376) will join the Navy for the NCF. Furthermore,
historically, 42 percent of all ACF participants are
obligated to serve at least four years, and 62 percent of
those enlisting for four years tested in AFQT categories
I-II. Applying these same percentages to the Navy, it is
estimated that an additional 2,181 high-quality recruits
(those in AFQT categories I-II) will enlist for four years in
the Navy to qualify for the NCF.
3. Cost of the Navy College Fund
The actual cost of the proposed Navy College Fund is
dependent upon the following factors: (1) the number of
participants; (2) the number of participants completing the
minimum length of service requirement; (3) the number of
participants making full contribution to the GI Bill; (4 the
number of participants utilizing benefits; (5) the percent of
earned benefit used; and (6) the timing of benefit utiliza-
tion. To develop a cost model for the Navy College Fund,
estimates of all of these variables must be developed.
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Under the revised DOD accrual system, the present
value of the Navy College Fund is estimated to be $1,460 per
participant. This fee is placed in a trust fund to finance
future educational benefits. The actual cost of the program
will not be known until after the initial NCF cohort has
completed its minimunm length of service and the ten-year
benefit period has elapsed.
/ The cost of the program to the Navy will be offset by
the program's outcomes, because higher-quality recruits are
more cost-effective than lower-quality recruits. Compared
with lower-quality recruits, for example, higher-quality
recruits are more likely to complete their first enlistment
and to finish training. They are also less likely than
lower-quality recruits to have disciplinary problems and are
more likely to be promoted to higher ranks in a shorter
period of time. Overall, high-quality sailors improve force
readiness by a greater extent. Of these factors, the cost of
attrition is a measurable value. The other factors impose a
virtually unknown cost on fleet units. The following
discussion explores the cost of all these factors.
4. Cost-Effectiveness of High-Quality Recruits
One objective of the NCF is to fill shortages in
critical skill ratings with high-quality enlistees.
Shortages in "A" school attendees are currently filled by
GENDET recruits (general detail recruits who enlist for one
of three general apprenticeship programs--Airman , Seaman,
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and Fireman) out of boot camp. This process of taking GENDET
recruits and placing them in vacant "A" school seats is
referred to as backfilling. By replacing the GENDETs with
high-quality recruits, attrition rates and cost should
decrease. As depicted in Table V, high-school diploma
graduates in AFQT categories I and II have much lower
attrition rates than do all other Navy recruits.
TABLE V
FIRST-TERM ATTRITION RATES OF NAVY RECRUITS WHO
ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY IN FISCAL 1984 WITH SCHOOL
GUARANTEES AND WITHOUT SCHOOL GUARANTEES,
BY AFQT CATEGORY AND EDUCATION LEVEL
AFQT
Category HSDG
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* Not applicable due to small size of cohort.
Note: Attrition rates are expressed as the percentage of all
recruits in the FY 1984 enlistment cohort that have failed to
complete a first-term of enlistment.
The following abbreviations are used here: HSDG is high
school diploma graduate; NHSDG is non-high school diploma




Based upon these data, NCF participants would be
expected to have an attrition rate that is 11 percent lower,
on average, than that of the GENDETs currently backfilling
"A" schools. If these GENDETs could be replaced by NCF
enlistees, the Navy could recruit fewer GENDET recruits.
This substitution would lead to a substantial savings for the
Navy by reducing both recruiting and training costs.
The actual cost of an attrition loss is a function of
the following: a one-time recruiting cost; training cost;
and post-service benefits (benefits include unemployment and
veterans' benefits for those who qualify), amortized over the
period of productive enlistment following the completion of
training [Ref 14 p. 3] . Recruitment cost has been estimated
to average $3,400 per Navy recruit [Ref 15]. The cost of
boot camp is estimated to be $4,592, and the weighted average
cost of 27 of the 29 "A" schools targeted by the NCF is
$13,706 [Ref 1 End 6]. These figures are combined for a
total cost of $21,690 for an enlistee leaving at the
six-month point (including training and recruitment costs
alone)
.
A 1979 GAO report on the cost of attrition estimates
that an individual, in fiscal 1977, who leaves at or beyond
the six-month point is eligible for an average of*'$12,765 in
veterans' benefits, which are available up to 50 years after
leaving the Service [Ref 14 p. 3] . In addition, GAO esti-
mates that the average Navy recruit experiencing attrition
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in 1977 was eligible for $838 in unemployment benefits. In
current dollars, these amounts sum to $24,215. Although the
present value of veterans' benefits is very small, much
smaller than the present value of the NCF, these attrition
costs to the government in the long run may very well eclipse
the cost of the NCF many times over.
Another positive aspect of high-quality sailors is
that they are less likely to experience disciplinary problems
than are other sailors. As depicted in Table VI, NHSDG and
GED recruits in the fiscal 1985 and 1986 accession cohorts
(those for which the most complete data are available) were
twice as likely to leave the Navy for a disciplinary reason
TABLE VI
DISCIPLINARY DISCHARGE RATES OF NAVY RECRUITS
WHO ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY IN FISCAL 1985 AND 1986,
BY AFQT CATEGROY AND EDUCATION LEVEL
HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA GRADUATES
AFQT Category
Fiscal Year I-II IIIA IIIB IV Total
1985 13 16 18 21 16
1986 11 14 17 20 14
NON HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA GRADUATES *
AFQT Category
Fiscal Year I-II IIIA IIIB IV Total
1985 35 38 36 29 36
1986 30 32 36 14 32
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center
* Includes GEDs.
Note: Disciplinary discharge rates are expressed as the
percentage of recruits in the enlistment cohort who were
discharged for disciplinary reasons, when each cohort had
reached 30 months of service.
46
than were HSDG recruits, and almost three times as likely as
were high-quality (AFQT categories I-II) enlistees.
The precise cost of disciplinary cases cannot be
easily estimated. Indiscipline imposes an unseen cost on the
individual and his command. This cost includes: loss of
productivity; administrative expenses; and damage to unit
readiness and morale. GAO estimated that Unauthorized
Absentees alone, for example, cost the military $1.1 billion
in lost productivity and administrative expenses over the
period from 1974 through 1977 [Ref 15 p. 11] . As the
quantity of high-quality personnel increases in the Navy, the
cost of indiscipline, based upon these attrition rates,
should decrease. This represents another aspect of the
cost-effectiveness of the recruits attracted by the NCF.
High-quality sailors will also enhance unit readi-
ness. The article "Are Smart Takers Better? AFQT and
Military Productivity", by Scribner et al, the authors found
that high-quality enlistees perform significantly better than
their lower-quality counterparts. The authors showed that
tankers scoring in the upper AFQT test categories contributed
significantly to the effectivenss of their tanks in training
compared to the tankers who scored in the lower AFQT test
categories when their tanks were fully operational. On this
point, the authors concluded that using a tank in a degraded
mode would cause the real effects of AFQT to emerge. It was
thus concluded that the independent effect of AFQT scores on
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tank performance should be considered in policy making [Ref
16 pp. 201-202]
.
Fagan, in "Comparative Costs of Alternative Forces in
the U.S. Army", found that higher-quality soldiers are more
cost-effective than lower-quality soldiers. Fagan based this
upon the understanding that high-quality soldiers have lower
rates of indiscipline, lower rates of unauthorized absence,
lower first-term attrition rates, higher probability of
success in schools, and faster promotion rates [Ref 17].
These two studies reinforce the perception that high-
quality sailors will have a positive impact upon the Navy,
supporting the cost-effectiveness of high-quality personnel.
Based upon the revised DOD accrual cost of a College
Fund participant, the cost of the NCF is estimated at
$3,184,260 (obtained by multiplying the individual cost of
$2,460 by the 2,181 NCF participants).
The recruitment of additional high-quality recruits
would lead to a requirement to recruit 240 fewer lower-
quality GENDET recruits (240 x 11 percent) . Based upon the
cost estimates of an attrition loss, the Navy could reduce
its recruiting and training expenditures by $5,205,600
($21,690 X 240), plus the savings in veterans' and unemploy-
ment benefits. This savings in attrition costs, if realized,
would greatly reduce the actual cost of the program.
There are three policy alternatives to the Navy
College Fund expressed in the Army Enlistment Supply Model.
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These policies involve increasing recruiters, military pay,
or enlistment bonus programs. The impact of expanding
recruiter and bonus programs are discussed below. j --•
5. Policy Alternatives
a. Expanding the Recruiter Force
The Army Enlistment Supply Model demonstrates an
elasticity of .69 for Army production recruiters. This
suggests that a one percent increase in production recruiters
would increase enlistments by .69 percent. Based upon the
number of production recruiters in March 1988, a one percent
increase in recruiters would result in adding 49 recruiters
to the Recruiting Battalions. These additional recruiters,
based upon the Army Enlistment Supply Model, should result in
an increase of 426 high-quality recruits for fiscal 1990.
The Navy Recruiting Command estimates the cost to
field an additional recruiter at $43,000 per year [Ref 18].
Based upon the model's estimate of an additional 8.5 recruits
attracted per recruiter, the cost of each additional high-
quality recruit is estimated at $5,058. Therefore, increasing
the number of production recruiters may not be as cost-effec-
tive as the Navy College Fund in increasing the number of
high-quality recruits. Addtionally, faced with a declining
youth population, addtional recruiters will face increased
competition with existing recruiters over the traditional
recruiting markets. In contrast, the NCF involves creating
an entry into the college-bound youth market. This is the
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familiar argument of diminishing returns to production
recruiters. The employment of recruiters may, therefore, be
left as it is now, assigned to recruiting districts based
upon population estimates and recruit mission.
b. Enlistment Bonus Program
The enlistment bonus offers another potentially
successful method for increasing the quantity of high-
quality recruits. The enlistment supply model suggests that
an enlistment bonus program is slightly more effective than
the college fund in increasing high-quality enlistments.
Theoretically, bonus program targets potential recruits who
are "present-minded" (as opposed to "forward-looking" members
of the college-bound youth market) and members of the tradi
tional recruiting market (who are not likely to be in the
college-bound youth market) . These individuals are planning
to enter the job market; therefore, an enlistment bonus may
be effective in making military employment more attractive
than civilian employment or by steering recruits into less-
desired ratings. For the most part, cash bonuses are not
advertised, and are primarily employed as a mechanism to
steer potential recruits into less desirable skill cate-
gories. (The Navy currently offers enlistment bonuses of up
to $2,500 to qualified enlistees entering targeted ratings,
who are willing to extend their initial enlistments by one
year, and a bonus of $3,000 to nuclear power program
enlistees, to delay their entry to ensure constant school
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loading, thus using the incentive as a method of skill
channeling [Ref 19]
.
The present value of the cost of an enlistment
bonus program may outweigh the present value of the cost of
the College Fund. In the two-year period from January 1986
to December 1987, 25,677 Army recruits participated in the '
Enlistment Bonus progam with an average bonus of $3,638 per
enlistment contract. [Ref 12, Table 1-1] If bonus-induced
recruits have the same early separation characteristics as do
other high-quality recruits, the average bonus per successful
recruit amounts of $4,836, compared to the cost of $1,460 for
the college fund. This is because the bonus, once paid, is a
sunk cost and cannot be retrieved if the recipient fails to
complete his or her contracted length-of-service. At the
same time, the College Fund is only available to those who
meet minimum length-of-service requirements and make the
required contributions to the GI Bill. Because of this, the
present value cost of a college fund participant who fails to
complete a first-term of enlistment is less than that of a
bonus program participant who does likewise.
c. Other Policies
The effects of advertising on high-quality
t
enlistments are not discussed because data on advertising
costs were not available. The effects of pay ratio on
recruiting is not discussed, because the implementation of
large military pay raises does not appear to be a practical
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option in the face of current budgetary deficits. In addi-
tion, military pay raises are determined by Congress, not by
the Services.
Based upon the results of the Army Enlistment
Supply Model, and the arguments on behalf of high-quality
recruits, the proposed Navy College Fund presents a workable
option for increasing the quantity of high-quality recruits
in a cost-effective manner. A college fund may also be more
favorably viewed than other recruitment incentives by the
public and Congress, since a college fund broadens life
opportunities available to an honorably-discharged Navy
veteran.
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSION
The results of this study suggest that the Navy College
Fund (or NCF) offers the Navy a cost-effective method to
increase the quantity of high-quality enlistees (that is
individuals who are high school diploma graduates, with test
scores in AFQT categories I-II) . As described previously,
the NCF is comparable in cost to current enlistment incen-
tives. Hov;ever, it goes beyond these traditional methods by
targeting a virtually untapped source of recruits--namely
,
the college-bound youth market. Furthermore, the impact upon
the Navy of the additional high-quality recruits, attracted
to enlist by the NCF, should diminish any perceptions of the
NCF as an expensive and wasteful enlistment incentive.
Since this program targets individuals who are not
members of the ;job-oriented youth market, the argument that
educational benefits are reenlistm.ent disincentives can be
discounted for two reasons. First, without the enhanced
educational benefits, it is likely that NCF participants
would not have entered the Navy in the first place. Second,
the short Army experience v;ith the ACF has resulted in
reenlistment rates as high as 36 percent, implying that a




Unlike a policy of expanding enlistment bonuses and a
policy of fielding of additional recruiters, the cost of the
NCF will not be accurately determined until the first round
of participants has had an opportunity to utilize the avail-
able benefits. This could be up to 14 years after the
program has been initiated, further reducing the present
value of the program per participant. Nevertheless, if all
participants used the entire benefit within the first four
years of discharge, the tuition assistance received by these
individuals would add to the human capital of the nation,
without adding to the Department of Education's ever-growing
student debt.
Another attribute of the NCF is the prospect of future
inter-Service competition over diminishing recruit resources.
Whereas, increases in recruiters and wider knowledge of
bonuses will most likely increase competition among the
Services, the NCF should not have this effect. It has long
been maintained that the ACF has not increased competition
among the Services because the program targets recruits from
the collge-bound youth market. The majority of ACF
participants are two-year enlistees entering combat arms
occupations. The NCF would only apply to four-year enlistees
who attend certain "A" schools. During the tenure of the
ACF, the numiber of Armiy four-year enlistees participating in
the ACF has decreased steadily from 56 percent of all ACF
participants in fiscal 1985 to 21 percent in fiscal 1988.
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The reduced interest in the Army's four-year program should
minimize the impact upon the ACF of the Navy's entry into the
college-bound youth market.
There is another potential benefit to the NCF; it may
lead potential recruits, who would not have otherwise found
the Navy attractive, to investigate the Navy as a job
opportunity.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Three recommendations are offered concerning the imple-
mentation of the NCF. First, the number of recruits
attracted by the college^^fund may be increased if the program
is extended to high-quality enlistees in AFQT categories I
through IIIA. Persons in this aptitude range have accounted
for 38 percent of the four-year enlistees participating in
the ACF since fiscal 1985. Additionally, the attrition rates
of these enlistees are similar to the attrition rate of
enlistees in AFQT categories I and II. Furthermore, the
impact on readiness and reductions in training cost
associated with enlistees in AFQT categories I through IIIA
would also be similar to that of high-quality recruits in
AFQT categories I and II. Based upon the analysis in the
previous chapter, the addition of AFQT category IIIA recruits
to the program would attract an additional 1,337 high-quality
recruits to the Navy annually. This could result in require-
ments to recruit 147 fewer lower-quality recruits and
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contribute additional savings in recruiting and training
costs.
(Second, caution must be exercised in setting quotas on
NCF enlistees. Strict adherence to quotas during the
"Multiple Option Recruiting Experiment" led to a reduction in
high-quality recruit accessions in one Navy test area. There-
fore, if the demand for the NCF by potentially qualified
recruits exceeds the quotas of NCF billets, expansion of the
program may be required. Otherwise, these potential high-
quality recxuits may be lost to the Navy.
The third recommendation is that consideration be given
to expanding the enlistment bonus program. The results of
the econometric analysis of this study suggest that the
enlisted bonus has a stronger impact (on the margin) than a
college fund on enlistment supply. Though the bonus targets
the traditional recruiting market of job-oriented youth, it
has been an effective means for the Army in steering recruits
to certain occupational specialties. And, unlike the college
fund, the cost of the bonus is a "given". If the bonus
program were to receive little, or no, advertising, it could
act as a passive means, minimizing inter-Service competition,
to make the Navy appear more attractive than the other
Services. This goes beyond the current emiployment of the
Navy's enlistment bonus program of ensuring the equal loading
of nuclear power schools and to increase the first-term
enlistments of individuals in selected ratings. The
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combination of a bonus program and enhanced educational
benefits should prove effective in increasing Navy high-
quality enlistments.
There are several related areas of study that may be
undertaken as a result of this thesis. As indicated during
the course of this study, further research into the cost of
an individual who fails to complete his or her first term of
service is needed. In addition, continued research into the
actual cost of the college fund would be beneficial for
future estimates of the impact of high-quality sailors on the
Navy. Along the same lines, research on the total cost of
indiscipline--in monetary and non-monetary terms--should be
undertaken
.
In conclusion, the Navy College Fund offers a cost-
effective method for filling a sizeable portion of the 8,684
"A" school assignments otherwise given to GENDET recruits.
It also provides the Navy with a proven means for reaching




The data were obtained from the U.S. Army Recruiting
Command, and consist of 78 monthly observations of each Army
Recruiting Battalion from October 1980 through March 1988.
Included in this data set were continuous variables and dummy
variables for Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force
recruiting. Data for the latter three services were incom-
plete, in that the number of recruiters were missing for the
first 12 months, and the number of high-quality recruit
accessions were missing for the first 48 months of the data
set. For the Army, data for the 19th Recruiting Battalion
were also missing for certain variables. And the 56th
battalion had observations for only a few months.
A detailed listing of each variable's composition and SAS
name follows:
BATTl: An alpha-numeric representing each Army Recruiting
battalion, 1A-6G.
BATT2 : A numeric, 1-56, representing each Army Recruiting
Battalion.
Month: A numeric, 1-78, for each month recorded in the data
set, where 1 = October 1980, etc.
Unemp : Unemployment, the unemployment rate for each
battalion.
Pay : Pay ratio, the military to civilian pay ratio for
each battalion. This was computed by comparing the




Miss : Mission, the high-quality recruit mission assigned to
each recruiting battalion.
Netdays : Number of production days within a given month.
Arrecr : Is the number of Army production recruiters assigned
to a battalion.
Nrrecr : Is the number of Navy production recruiters in the
Army battalion area.
Frrecr : Is the number of Air Force production recruiters in
the Army battalion area.
Mrrecr : Is the number of Marine Corps production recruiters
in the Army battalion area.
Apop : Is the qualified high-quality youth population in the
battalion. All population figures are based upon
Woods and Pooles forecasts using the 1980 census.
Bpop : Is the black youth population in the battalion.
Hpop : Is the Hispanic youth population in the battalion.
Mpop : Is the qualified male youth population, 17-21 years
of age, in the battalion.
Opop : Is the "other" minority youth population in the
battalion
.
Wpop : Is the white youth population in the battalion.
GSA2 : Is the quantity of high-quality Arm.y recruits per
battalion
OSl : Is the quantity of high-quality Navy recruits per
battalion.
QS2 : Is the quantity of high-quality Marine Corps recruits
per battalion.
033 : Is the quantity of high-quality Air Force recruits
per battalion.
Bill : Is a dummy variable representing the Veap Kicker test
program, set to 1 when the program was in effect and
otherwise.
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NCVP; Is a dummy variable representing the Non-Contributory
VEAP test program, set to 1 when the program was in
effect and otherwise.
EBTC ; Is a dummy variable representing the Enlisted Bonus
Test Cell, set to 1 when the program was in effect
and otherwise.
EBT8K : Is a dummy variable representing the $8,000 Enlisted
Bonus Test Cell, set to 1 when the program was in
effect and otherwise.
EBT84K : Is a dummy variable representing the $8,000 and
$4,000 Enlisted Bonus Test Cell, set to 1 when the
program was in effect and otherwise.
Fund: Is a duimny variable representing the Army College
Fund, set to 1 when the program is in effect and
otherv^ise
.
Bonus : Is a dummy variable representing the Enlisted Bonus





As discussed previously, the variable mission was omitted
from the econometric models because the goal of the analyses
in this study was forecasting, and for the most, part Army
Recruiting Battalions met or exceeded their high-quality
mission quotas. But, as described in several econometric
analyses of enlistment supply, high-quality mission has been
statistically significant in modeling enlistment supply [Ref
6 and Ref 9]
.
To reflect the influence of high-quality mission on
enlistment supply, will require adding the log of high-
quality recruit mission to the econometric model of enlist-
ment supply. The econometric analysis, with mission,
utilizes the same data set described earlier--53 Army
Recruiting Battalions over a 78-month period from October
1980 through March 1988. The sample contains 4,134 observa-
tions. The dependent variable is the log of high-quality
enlistments. As displayed in Table VII, the inclusion of the
variable mission, in the enlistment supply model, alters the
model significantly. Column 1 of Table VII provides the
results of estimating the model by the OLS procedure without
correcting for autocorrelation. Column 2 provides the
results after correcting for autocorrelation. This correc-
tion was accomplished through the Parks method, utilizing GSL
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estimators, assuming a first-order autoregressive (ARl) error
structure. Column 1 of Table III includes dummy variables
for the second, third, and fourth quarter of the fiscal year.
The log-linear form is used for each of these models.
Therefore, the coefficient estimates may be interpreted as
elasticities
.
The results in Table VII are remarkably robust: all of
the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at
the .01 level or better. The explanatory power of the model
is slightly better than that of the model (see Table III)
without the variable mission. As depicted in Table VII, the
inclusion of the variable mission greatly reduces the
influence of the other variables in the model. Of interest
to this study were the coefficients of the variables
representing the ACF and enlisted bonus programs.
By including mission as a variable, the elasticity of the
ACF dropped from a .376 to a .142 in the uncorrected model,
and from a .256 to a .138 in the corrected model. The
elasticity of enlistment bonus also decreased from a .223 to
a .091 in the uncorrected model, and from a .289 to a .173 in
the corrected model.
Mission does have a significant effect on high-quality
enlistments and on the econometric analysis of high-quality
enlistments. But, iriission was not included in the enlistment
rate and the enlistment supply model of this study because it
cannot be accurately predicted for use in forecasting. And
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the goal of this study was to forecast the impact of educa-
tional benefits on enlistment supply. However, as the models
in Table VII indicate, mission may be considered when
evaluating recruiting policy options.
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TABLE VII
RESULTS OF THE ARMY HIGH-QUALITY ENLISTMENT SUPPLY MODEL
MODEL WITH THE VARIABLE MISSION
Independent ,
Variable Model 1^ Model 2
Unemployment 0.345 0.397
(.014) (.009)














Second Qtr 0.084 N/A
(.033)
Third Qtr 0.228 N/A
(.033)
Fourth Qtr 0.048 N/A
(.033)
R'^ .747 N/A
Root M.S.E. .236 .998
* Figures in parenthesis are standard errors.
** Note all variables are statistically sngnificant for
p > 0. 0001.
a-- Model uncorrected for autocorrelation, utilizing
OLS.
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